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Abstract 
People often make inferences about the values of other people in their families, cities, 
and countries, but there are reasons to expect systematic biases in these inferences.  Across 
four studies (N = 1,763), we examined people’s perceptions of the values of their families, 
fellow citizens of the cities in which they live, and compatriots across three nations (Brazil, 
Germany, UK).  Our results show that people systematically misperceive comparison groups’ 
values.  People underestimate the importance that their compatriots ascribe to more important 
values and overestimate the importance of less important values.  This occurs in comparison 
to their own values, the actual values of the people living in the same city, and the actual 
values of their compatriots.  The effect sizes were medium to large.  Furthermore, the results 
occurred independently of participants’ culture, time spent in the culture, and the underlying 
value model used.  These results consistently show that people’s speculations about values in 
their community and society are biased in a self- and family-favoring direction.  Additionally, 
we found that the structure of values (e.g., as proposed by Schwartz, 1992) holds for 
perceived family, fellow citizens of the cities in which they live, and compatriots’ values.  
Overall, our findings suggest that the values of other people are more selfless than is often 
believed. 
Keywords: values, compatriots’ values, perceived values, sojourners 
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The Perception of Family, City, and Country Values is often Biased 
Many people believe that the state of values within their society is deteriorating.  For 
example, in 2016, 73% of US-Americans believed that their country’s values are getting 
worse rather than better (McCarthy, 2016), and in Germany, the expression “deterioration of 
values” is often used by politicians and the police to condemn negative developments and 
events (Heinemann, 2016).  Further, some Brazilian right-wing politicians are promising that 
they will reinforce democratic and traditional Brazilian values which are, in their view, 
declining (Alvares, 2016).  Statements about declining values rely on the assumption that 
people’s perception of societal values is accurate.  If the values of the society are 
misperceived, however, this would question claims about a decline in values.  To the best of 
our knowledge, research has not tested how accurately people perceive the values of the city 
and country in which they are living.  Across four studies and three countries, while using two 
value models, the present research provides the first direct examination of this accuracy.  
Human Values 
Contemporary psychological models define human values as abstract guiding 
principles in our life (Gouveia, 2013; Schwartz, 1992).  For instance, according to Schwartz’s 
circumplex model (1992), values can be organized along two orthogonal dimensions: self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement values and openness versus conservation values 
(Figure 1).  The former dimension contrasts benevolence and universalism values, which 
transcend personal interests to consider the welfare of others, with power and achievement 
values, which focus on promotion of the self.  The other dimension contrasts conformity, 
security, and tradition values, which promote the status quo, with self-direction and 
stimulation values, which promote intellectual and emotional interests in uncertain directions.  
Hedonism falls between openness and self-enhancement values because it shares elements of 
both higher-order value types.  Schwartz (1992) has found that this structure of values is 
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almost universal, as supported by findings from over 70 countries (cf. Bilsky, Janik, & 
Schwartz, 2011).   
 
Figure 1. The value model of Schwartz (1992). 
Another important cross-cultural finding is that there are large similarities in people’s 
value priorities around the world.  Across more than 56 countries and various samples, 
Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found that benevolence values (e.g., loyalty, helpfulness) are 
considered most important, followed by self-direction (e.g., freedom, independence) and 
universalism values (e.g., equality, wisdom).  In contrast, stimulation (e.g., an exciting life, 
daring), tradition (e.g., respect for tradition, humble), and power values (e.g., wealth, 
authority) are considered least important.  Schwartz and Bardi argue that benevolence values 
are rated on average as most important, because they “provide the internalized motivational 
base for cooperative and supportive social relations” (p. 281).  In contrast, power values are 
considered to be least important because they might threaten positive social relations. 
Another model of values is Gouveia’s (2013) functional theory.  This theory assumes 
that values can be ordered along two dimensions: goals and needs (Gouveia, Milfont, & 
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Guerra, 2014a).  The first dimension outlines personal, central, and social goals, whereas the 
second dimension distinguishes between survival and thriving needs.  Taken together, this 
model assumes six sub-functions (Figure 2).  Although there are some differences between 
Gouveia’s (2013) and Schwartz’s (1992) models, both theorists agree that the content of the 
values is similar between the models (Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014b; Schwartz, 2014).  
For example, the promotion sub-function in Gouveia’s theory contains values that overlap 
with the power and achievement domains (i.e., self-enhancement values) in Schwartz’s 
theory, and the excitement sub-function is related to hedonism and stimulation values. 
 
  Values as guides of actions (circle of goals) 
  Personal goals  Central goals  Social goals  
V
a
lu
es
 a
s 
ex
p
re
ss
io
n
s 
o
f 
n
ee
d
s 
 
(l
ev
el
 o
f 
n
ee
d
s)
 
Thriving  
needs 
Excitement Values  
Emotion  
Pleasure  
Sexuality 
Suprapersonal Values  
Beauty  
Knowledge  
Maturity 
Interactive Values  
Affection  
Belonging  
Support 
Survival  
needs 
Promotion Values  
Power  
Prestige  
Success 
Existence Values  
Health  
Stability  
Survival 
Normative Values  
Obedience  
Religiosity  
Tradition 
Figure 2.  The functional theory of human values.  Adapted from Gouveia et al. (2014a). 
Perceptions of Other People 
In the present research, we compare people’s own values with how they perceive the 
values of their families, fellow citizens of the cities in which they live, and compatriots in 
their society.  In addition, we set out to test how accurately people perceive others’ values.  
Based on previous research, we hypothesize that there are systematic differences in people’s 
estimations of others’ values – differences that are consistent with previous research 
examining perceptions of others’ traits.  People perceive moral traits, such as being reliable 
and honest, to be more characteristic for themselves than for the average person or student 
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(Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Alicke, 
Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001; Tappin & McKay, 2017).  In contrast, people perceive 
traits that are usually considered as negative, such as being disrespectful or snobbish, as less 
characteristic for themselves than for the average person.  Recent research has found that this 
effect is persistent.  For example, even prisoners consider themselves more prosocial than 
non-prisoners (Sedikides, Meek, Alicke, & Taylor, 2014).  In addition, the effect is larger 
among people with higher socio-economic status (Varnum, 2015), and made-up theories 
attributed to oneself are preferred more than theories attributed to strangers or no-one (Gregg, 
Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017).   
Testing whether this misperception of other people’s characteristics also occurs in 
values is important because values are usually defined as primarily positive constructs (Hitlin 
& Piliavin, 2004), which vary in their importance (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).  Thus, all values 
are presumably perceived as at least somewhat characteristic for oneself (because there are no 
value equivalents to less desirable traits such as disrespectful or snobbish).  Based on this 
attribute of values, one might expect that all values should be perceived to be equally or more 
important for oneself than for other people.  However, an alternative hypothesis is that the 
misperception of other people’s values is negated or reversed in values that are generally of 
lower importance.  This moderation-by-value view is indirectly supported by a range of 
studies finding that certain values relate to outcomes that are generally considered to be 
negative.  For example, the least important value type, power (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), was 
found to predict outcomes such as prejudice (Feather & McKee, 2008; Souchon, Maio, Hanel, 
& Bardin, 2017), negative attitudes towards the environment (Schultz & Zelezny, 1999), or 
negative traits including callousness, hostility, and manipulativeness (Zacharopoulos et al., 
2018).  In contrast, universalism and benevolence were negatively related to these outcomes.  
Thus, some values may be perceived as less desirable, although they are still rated as 
important for oneself. Furthermore, everyday experiences with strangers may further result in 
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an overestimation of other people’s power, achievement, and hedonism values: Strangers are 
often encountered in settings which promote power and achievement values such as in a 
business context or in shopping malls.  Indeed, people felt that business contexts would 
encourage self-enhancement values more than self-transcendence values – and vice versa for 
art galleries (Common Cause Foundation, 2016).  Hence, we expect that individuals see 
themselves as higher in values that are commonly important (e.g., benevolence, self-direction, 
and universalism), but lower in other values that are commonly less important (e.g., power 
and stimulation).  We discuss potential underlying mechanisms of this effect further in the 
General Discussion.   
The Present Research 
In the present studies, we test whether other people’s values are perceived to be 
different than own values, whether other’s values are misperceived and if so, whether this 
misperception occurs across all values in the same direction or is moderated by value type 
(i.e., are all values perceived to be more important for oneself than other people or are there 
some values which are perceived to be less important for oneself than other people?).  In 
addition, we considered different comparison groups.  Specifically, we compared participants’ 
ratings of their own values with those of their own family, fellow citizens of their city, and 
compatriots in their society.  We expected the misperceptions to occur in all of these 
comparisons.  At the same time, however, we expected that the bias in perceiving values also 
extends beyond participants’ own values to include groups to which they are strongly 
attached.  Individuals have been shown to be motivated to rate their ingroups (which are 
psychologically closer to the self) more favorably than outgroups (Eriksson & Funcke, 2015).  
Given that one’s family can be expected to be more psychologically close to the self, 
participants may also see their own family as holding values that are morally superior to those 
held by the society in which they live.  Thus, we also expected the difference between own 
and other people’s values to be larger in self-compatriots comparisons than in self-family 
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comparisons, because the family is usually considered as an ingroup and thus closer to the self 
(Tropp & Wright, 2001). 
Our research also addressed a deficit in cross-cultural comparisons.  The above cited 
evidence for the existence of trait misperceptions originates from Western countries.  
However, cross-cultural research has found that the misperceptions of other people’s traits 
was less pronounced or even non-existent in non-Western countries (Heine, Lehman, Markus, 
& Kitayama, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), especially for negative traits (Lee, 2012) or 
culturally unimportant traits (Tam et al., 2012).  We therefore tested whether this finding can 
also be replicated by comparing two countries that are considered as Western (Germany and 
the UK) with one non-Western country (Brazil).  This comparison is important because a 
significant portion of research findings from Western countries do not replicate in non-
Western countries (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  In addition, we considered 
whether the findings can be replicated in a sample of immigrants.   
Finally, we tested across all studies whether the structure of human values for 
perceived family, fellow citizens of their city, and compatriots’ values is the same as for 
participants’ own values, which we report for Study 1 below and for Studies 2-4 in the 
Supplemental Materials.  To the best of our knowledge, these aims have not been investigated 
before.  The datasets for all studies and the Supplemental Materials can be found on 
https://osf.io/9agfd/?view_only=1422f9ae2a764ca18ce309ac50cc15ed  
Study 1 
Study 1 began examining our hypotheses using a student sample in Germany.  The 
study enabled our first test of whether self-other differences and misperceptions occurs for all 
values or only for those values that are seen as more important.  To perform this test, 
participants rated the importance of values from Schwartz’s circular model across three 
targets: self, family, and country.  Additionally, we tested whether the postulated circular 
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structure of values holds for all target groups.  This was also done to test the reliability of the 
value scales. 
Method 
Participants.  Two-hundred and ten students from a German university completed the 
survey (Mage = 22.21, SD = 3.65, 65% women) in 2013.  Most of them were studying various 
subjects (e.g., Mathematics, English) to become a teacher.   
Material and Procedure.  To measure participants’ own values and their perceptions 
of their family’s and country’s values, we utilized a modified version of the 10-item Short 
Schwartz Value Survey (SSVS; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005) in its German translation 
(Boer, 2014).  Example items include “Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating 
competence according to social standards” and “Self-direction: Independent thought and 
action-choosing, creating, exploring”.  Participants rated the importance of the values using a 
6-point scale ranging from 1 (completely unimportant) to 6 (very important).  We modified 
the SSVS in a way that participants first indicated the personal importance of a value type for 
them, followed by the importance for the family and country.  Most participants completed 
the survey in one lecture hall and were not compensated. 
Study 1 was part of a larger survey in which additionally personality traits (Big-5), 
self-esteem, and satisfaction with life were measured.  None of this data is reported elsewhere, 
this includes manuscripts in preparation. 
Results and Discussion 
We first report the comparison of self-family, self-country, and family-country 
comparison, before we test whether the proposed structure of values (Figure 1; Schwartz, 
1992) holds for family and compatriots’ values.  This test is also important to assess the 
reliability of the three value scales, because each value type was measured with a single item.  
Self-family value comparisons.  We examined how participants perceived their own values 
compared to the values of their family with a set of within-subject t-tests.  The effect sizes 
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were computed using pooled standard deviations.  Compared to their own value importance 
ratings, participants perceived their family as attaching more importance to conformity, and 
less importance to achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, and 
benevolence (Figure 3 and Table 1). 
Self-compatriots’ value comparisons.  We examined how participants perceived 
their own values compared to the values of their country again with a set of within-subject t-
tests.  Compared to their own value importance ratings, participants perceived their country as 
attaching more importance to power and achievement, and less importance to hedonism, 
stimulation, self-direction, universalism, and benevolence (Figure 3 and Table 1).  As 
predicted, the correlation between the importance of the 10 value types correlated positively 
with the self-country bias, r(8) = .43.  Specifically, we correlated the importance of the own 
values (Table 1, column 2) with the Cohen’s d of the self-country comparisons (Table 1, 
column 7).  This suggests that people underestimate the importance their compatriots ascribe 
to more important values and overestimate the importance of less important values. 
Family-compatriots’ value comparisons.  We examined how participants perceived 
their family values compared to the values of their country again with a set of within-subject 
t-tests.  Compared to their family, participants perceived their country as attaching more 
importance to power, achievement, and stimulation and less importance to self-direction, 
universalism, benevolence, and security (Figure 3 and Table 1). 
Table 1 shows that participants’ perceptions of their family’s values tended to be 
closer to their own values than to perceptions of their country’s values.  Correlational analyses 
supported this finding: The importance that the participants ascribed to all 10 value types 
correlated highly with the perceived importance of the values in their family (.43 < r < .70, all 
ps < .001), but not with the perceived importance of the values in their country (-.11 < r < .17, 
.02 < p < .95).  
Table 1 
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Descriptive statistics and within-subject comparisons of perceived value importance 
for self, family, and country 
                              Mean (SD)                                             t  Cohen’s d 
 Self Family Country    
Power 2.94 (1.07) 2.93 (1.09) 4.94 (0.95) 0.14/-21.44 /*** 0.01/-1.48 
Achievement 4.60 (0.96) 4.41 (0.94) 5.38 (0.82) 2.89/-9.12 **/*** 0.20/-0.63 
Hedonism 4.62 (0.94) 4.20 (0.94) 4.28 (1.15) 7.48/3.36 ***/*** 0.52/0.23 
Stimulation 4.67 (1.09) 3.85 (1.03) 4.08 (1.15) 10.83/5.62 ***/*** 0.75/0.39 
Self-direction 5.46 (0.69) 4.98 (0.92) 4.48 (1.23) 8.01/10.16 ***/*** 0.55/0.70 
Universalism 5.43 (0.75) 5.06 (0.90) 4.09 (1.29) 6.47/12.94 ***/*** 0.45/0.90 
Benevolence 5.39 (0.70) 5.16 (0.79) 4.17 (0.99) 4.12/15.80 ***/*** 0.28/1.09 
Tradition 4.10 (1.27) 4.13 (1.19) 4.01 (1.05) -0.51/0.75  -0.03/0.05 
Conformity 4.22 (1.20) 4.51 (0.98) 4.60 (1.01) -4.50/-3.34 ***/*** -0.31/-0.23 
Security 5.21 (0.91) 5.28 (0.78) 4.99 (1.02) -1.36/2.47 /* -0.09/0.17 
Note.  The first numeric values (t, p, and d) before the slash refer to self-family comparison, and the 
numbers after the slash refer to the self-country comparison.  Dfs were between 207 and 209, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.  Perceived value importance for self, family, and country.  
Structure of values.  Finally, we tested whether the structure of Schwartz’s (1992) 
value model (see Figure 1) holds for the perceived familial and perceived societal values.  To 
do this, we used Schwartz’s recommended method of multidimensional scaling (MDS) with 
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an approach suggested by Bilsky et al. (Bilsky & Janik, 2010; Bilsky et al., 2011).  That is, we 
computed all inter-item correlations and conducted MDS using the theory-based starting 
configurations provided by Schwartz’s model.  Consistent with previous value research 
(Gouveia et al., 2014b), we report the Tucker's congruence coefficient and the Stress-I values.  
Because the Stress-I values might not be suitable to assess model fit if a range of values are 
analyzed, we focus on Tucker’s congruence coefficient, where values above .95 are 
considered as good, between .85 and .94 as fair (Lorenzo-Seva & ten Berge, 2006).  Tucker's 
congruence coefficient indicated good fit for the own values (.996, Stress-I = .09), the 
perceived family values (.996, Stress-I = .09), and perceived societal values (.997, Stress-I = 
.08).  More importantly however, the common space plots supported Schwartz’ structure 
(Figure 4).  Only small deviations within the higher order value types were found.  For 
example, security was in all cases closer to benevolence and universalism than to power.  
However, small deviations are negligible, as long as the values types were all group together 
within the higher order value types (Bilsky et al., 2011).  This was the case: achievement was 
for all three measurements of values positioned next to power; tradition, conformity, and 
security were next to each other, as were benevolence and universalism, and the three 
openness value types self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism.  Overall, the model-consistent 
findings support the reliability of the three versions of the SSVS we used to measure own, 
perceived family, and perceived societal values. 
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Figure 4.  Common space plots for own values (panel A), perceived familial values 
(panel B), and perceived societal values (panel C).  
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Summary. Study 1 provided our first test of potential misperceptions relating to 
values.  The findings robustly supported the hypothesis that the misperceptions depend on 
value type, such that participants perceived benevolence and universalism to be more 
important for themselves in comparison to their family and particularly in comparison to their 
compatriots.  Participants also perceived their country to attribute more importance to power 
and achievement values, but not their family, suggesting that the self-other differences are 
stronger for self-compatriot comparisons than for self-family comparisons.  In the following 
studies, we replicate this initial evidence.  This replication is also necessary because 
generalizing from student samples to the general public can be problematic (Hanel & Vione, 
2016), as students are younger and potentially more educated than members of their family 
and country.  Thus, testing whether these initial findings hold in a representative sample could 
rule out potential age and educational effects. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, a representative sample within a large British city was asked how they 
perceive the values of the average person living in the same city.  Study 2 overcame a 
limitation of Study 1, wherein the representative control group has completed a different 
value survey than our sample.  Study 2 included the same survey for the comparisons.  We 
expected that comparing personal values to perceptions of the values of people in one’s own 
city would reveal the same patterns as our prior comparisons between personal values and 
perceptions of the values of people in one’s own country.  This focus on a city-level is useful 
given the potential greater concreteness and tangibility of cities for residents.   
Method 
Participants.  In total, 1,184 participants from Greater Manchester (“Mancunians”) 
took part in an online survey from all 10 boroughs of Greater Manchester.  Participants were 
640 women, 540 men, two indicated ‘Other’ and two preferred not to say.  One hundred and 
thirty-three participants were aged 18-24, 211 were aged 25-34, 209 were aged 35-44, 234 
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were aged 45-54, 206 were aged 55-64, 165 were aged 65-74, 24 were aged 75+, and two 
preferred not to say.  One-thousand twelve participants (85.9%) identified themselves as 
British, 33 as Pakistani (2.8%), and 18 (1.5%) as Chinese.   
Material.  Participants were first asked to complete the standard 21-item Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001).  The internal consistencies were 
acceptable (α = .60 - .73), except for self-direction (α = .41) and tradition (α = .36).  
Subsequently, we asked participants to fill in a similar 21-item PVQ, except that they now 
indicated to what extent each described person is like “a typical person living in Greater 
Manchester”.  For instance, the description “It is important to him to be rich. He wants to 
have a lot of money and expensive things” was answered on a scale from 1 (not at all like a 
typical person living in Greater Manchester) to 6 (very much like a typical person living in 
Greater Manchester).  The internal consistencies were acceptable to good (α = .57 - .78).  
Because the sample is already representative, all differences between own and perceived 
values simultaneously indicate a misperception of the Greater Mancunians’ values.  
Participants completed an online survey and were compensated with a small amount of 
money.  Study 2 was part of a larger survey in which additional societal and environmental 
concerns, civic engagement, and political attitudes were measured.  This data was used in 
another manuscript to compare those who voted to leave Europe with those who voted to 
remain during the EU-Referendum in June 2016 (Hanel & Wolf, 2018).  In this other 
manuscript, no comparisons between own and perceived values are made.  Also, the structure 
of values is not reported.  Additionally, this study functioned as a comparator condition (i.e., 
no manipulation was applied) for an experiment that tested whether informing people that 
others either value self-transcendence values more strongly than self-enhancement values or 
vice versa would influence their civic engagement (see footnote 1 in the General Discussion 
for a short summary).   
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Results and Discussion 
Self-city value comparisons and accuracy of perceived values.  We compared how 
participants perceived their own values compared to the values of their fellow citizens of their 
city, using a set of within-subject t-tests.  The effect sizes were again computed using pooled 
standard deviations.  Participants perceived their fellow Mancunians as valuing power, 
achievement, hedonism, and stimulation more than themselves, and as valuing self-direction, 
universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security less than themselves (Table 2).  
Further, the importance that participants ascribed to all 10 value types correlated with the 
importance of the perceived values (.23 < r < .43, all ps < .001).  Overall, these results show 
that the pattern of self-city comparisons is similar to the pattern of self-country comparisons.  
As in Study 1, the correlation between the importance of the 10 value types participants 
attributed to the value types for themselves correlated positively with the self-country bias, 
r(8) = .86.  This suggests that people underestimate the importance their compatriots ascribe 
to more important values and overestimate the importance of less important values.  The 
pattern of results was the same across all 10 boroughs in Greater Manchester.   
We then tested for potential age effects.  First, we conducted a MANOVA with all 10 
value types as dependent variables to test for age mean differences on values.  The MANOVA 
was significant, F(60, 7062) = 4.72, p < .001, partial η2= .04.  We found the largest effects for 
achievement, F(6, 1181) = 22.21, p < .001, partial η2= .10, and stimulation values, F(6, 1181) 
= 18.66, p < .001, partial η2= .09.  Consistent with previous research (Robinson, 2012), 
younger people valued both stimulation and achievement more than older people.  We report 
detailed results in the Supplemental Materials (Tables S1 to S3).  Next, we explored whether 
there are age effects for the within-subject comparisons of the own and perceived values, by 
first computing the Cohen’s ds, which we report in Table 2 (last column) separately for each 
age group (see Table S4).  To test whether the self-other perceptions are similar across age 
groups, we correlated the 10 Cohen’s ds obtained from each age group with those of the other 
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age groups.  The correlations were all very large, rs(8) = .83-99, ps ≤ .003, indicating that age 
has little impact on how the values of the fellow citizens of their city are perceived relative to 
their own values.  However, we observed two exceptions.  Achievement was on average 
perceived by six out of the seven age groups to be of less importance for themselves than the 
citizens of their city (average d = -0.40), but not among the 18 to 24 year old participants, for 
whom a weak trend was in the opposite direction, t(148) = 1.41, p = .16, d = 0.14.  The same 
pattern was observed for stimulation, which was on average perceived by six out of the seven 
age groups to be of less importance for themselves than the citizens of their city (average d = -
0.32), but not among the 18 to 24 year old participants, for whom a weak trend was in the 
opposite direction, t(148) = 0.86, p = .39, d = 0.08. 
To test whether the pattern of results in Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, we 
correlated the effect sizes Cohen’s d for all 10 self-societal comparisons of Study 1 with the 
Cohen’s ds for the 10 self-city comparisons.  The correlation was positive, r(8) = .65, 
suggesting that Study 2 indeed replicated Study 1.  Finally, we found that the structure of 
Schwartz’s (1992) value model holds for own and perceived values (see Supplemental 
Materials, Figure S1).  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and within-subject comparison of the perceived value 
importance for self and fellow citizens of their city 
 Mean (SD) t  Cohen’s d 
 Self     City    
Power 2.82 (1.14) 3.58 (1.09) -20.34 *** -0.61 
Achievement 3.48 (1.22) 3.85 (1.03) -9.38 *** -0.28 
Hedonism 3.64 (1.14) 4.27 (1.05) -16.81 *** -0.50 
Stimulation 3.46 (1.24) 3.79 (1.04) -8.10 *** -0.24 
Self-direction 4.28 (1.00) 3.95 (1.01) 8.94 *** 0.26 
Universalism 4.51 (0.91) 3.59 (1.06) 27.12 *** 0.80 
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Benevolence 4.66 (0.98) 4.03 (1.06) 18.76 *** 0.56 
Tradition 4.02 (1.10) 3.43 (1.08) 15.73 *** 0.47 
Conformity 3.91 (1.16) 3.24 (1.13) 16.91 *** 0.50 
Security 4.49 (1.08) 4.18 (1.05) 9.28 *** 0.28 
Note.  All dfs = 1179. 
Study 3 
Study 3 set out to extend our investigation to people from a non-Western country, 
Brazil (Hofstede, 2001).  As described above, previous research found that misperceptions for 
traits in non-Western country are attenuated (Heine et al., 1999; Lee, 2012; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).  We therefore hypothesized that no self-other differences would occur for 
values in a non-Western country.  We also explored how accurately Brazilians perceived their 
compatriots’ values.  In this study, we relied on a different model of values, Gouveia’s 
functional theory (2013), to test whether the findings of Study 1 transcend the specific 
wording of Schwartz’s (1992) value model.  
Method 
Participants.  One-hundred and five Brazilian participants completed the survey (Mage 
= 30.92, SD = 13.25, age range = 17-73; 55 women).  Seventy-three participants were single, 
20 married, four divorced, and eight “other”.  Six participants completed at least high school, 
36 had yet an incomplete higher education, 35 a full higher education, and 28 had a post-
graduate degree.  None of the participants had lived abroad for more than three months.   
Material and procedure.  Participants completed a range of measures, with only a 
subset being relevant to the present study.  We assessed values with the Basic Values Survey 
(Gouveia, 2003), which measures each of the six value sub-functions with three items (e.g., 
“SUCCESS. To reach your goals; to be efficient in everything you do.” [promotion value]).  
Participants were instructed to rate how important they consider each of the values as a 
guiding principle in their life.  Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(completely unimportant) to 7 (of the utmost importance).  In the compatriot’s version of the 
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value survey, participants were asked to rate how important they consider the values as 
guiding principles for a typical (native) Brazilian citizen, using the same 7-point response 
scale.  The internal consistencies of the six value types were generally acceptable, both for the 
personal (.60 ≤ αs ≤ .76) and country version (.61 ≤ αs ≤ .71).  In the country version, the 
internal consistencies of the perceived promotion sub-function was low, α = .45, as were the 
internal consistencies of the own supra-personal (α = .33) and existence (α = .49) sub-
functions.  Participants were recruited through social networks, completed an online survey, 
and were not compensated. 
Representative comparison group.  For the representative comparison groups, we 
used data from another ongoing project (Liu & Vilar, 2017), which consists of 1058 to 1072 
participants (the number of respondents varies slightly across sub-functions).  All participants 
completed the Basic Values Survey (Gouveia, 2003) along with a range of other measures 
unrelated to the present study.   
Results and Discussion 
Self-compatriots’ value comparisons.  The pattern of results of Studies 1 and 2 was 
largely replicated in a Brazilian sample using Gouveia’s functional theory (2013; Table 3).  
Participants perceived the values which were most important to them, supra-personal and 
existence values, as less important for their compatriots than themselves, and promotion and 
excitement values as more important for their compatriots than themselves.  This largely 
replicates the findings of Study 1 and 2 that universalism (~ supra-personal) values were 
perceived as more important for oneself than for the compatriots, whereas power and 
achievement (~promotion) values were perceived as less important.  Because of the low 
reliability of the supra-personal sub-function, we repeated the analysis with the three items 
separately.  However, the pattern of results remained the same (all ps < .001).  The correlation 
between own and perceived compatriots’ values were again small (-.06 < r < .18), replicating 
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the findings of Study 1.  As in Studies 1 and 2, the importance participants attributed to the 
value types for themselves correlated positively with the self-country bias, r(4) = .82.   
Accuracy of perceived compatriots’ values.  The accuracy of the perceived 
compatriots’ values was similar to Studies 1 and 2.  Compatriots’ supra-personal, existence, 
and, somewhat surprisingly, normative values were underestimated, whereas excitement 
values were overestimated.  The effect size for supra-personal values was particularly large, 
which is in line with previous findings that the self-other differences are stronger for positive 
traits in non-Western countries (Lee, 2012).  Finally, we found that the structure of 
Gouveias’s (2013) value model holds for own and perceived values (see Supplemental 
Materials, Figure S2).  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and comparison of perceived value importance for self and 
compatriots and with actual value importance 
 Mean (SD) t-value Cohen’s ds 
 Self Country Representative Self-Country  Country-Actual  
Excitement 4.84 (1.02) 5.23 (1.05) 4.94 -2.87**  2.78** -0.28/0.28 
Suprapersonal 5.75 (0.71) 3.97 (1.30) 5.56 13.24***  -12.55*** 1.29/-1.22 
Interactive 5.41 (1.08) 5.26 (1.21) 5.45 0.96  -1.61 0.09/-0.16 
Promotion 4.67 (1.02) 4.96 (1.11) 4.83 -1.97*  1.16 -0.19/0.12 
Existence 6.04 (0.76) 5.19 (1.12) 5.89 7.05***  -6.42*** 0.69/-0.63 
Normative 4.37 (1.52) 4.76 (1.33) 5.57 -1.93  -6.22*** -0.19/-0.61 
Note.  All dfs = 104 for pairwise comparison.  The first Cohen’s d refers to self-country comparison, the 
second d refers to country-actual (representative) comparison, which is computed as Mdiff/SD. 
Study 4 
Study 4 aimed to test whether the self-other differences and the misperceptions of 
other people’s values would also hold for people judging the values of a country in which 
they are only temporarily living.  Specifically, the sample included Brazilian students who 
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were abroad at the time of data collection for at least six months.  We relied again on the 
functional theory of values (Gouveia, 2013).   
Method 
Participants.  Two-hundred sixty-eight Brazilian under- and postgraduate students 
completed the survey (158 females, 88 males, 22 missing).  The participants were abroad at 
the time of data collection for at least six months (n = 120) or had finished their stay abroad (n 
= 148).  Their mean age was 24.87 years (SD = 4.18).  The majority went abroad to Western 
countries, with the UK (n = 59), Spain (n = 24), and USA (n = 24) being selected the most 
often.  Students were from a wide range of scientific fields (e.g., medicine, psychology). 
Material and procedure.  Participants completed a range of measures, with only a 
subset being relevant for the present study.  The personal and perceived (temporary) 
compatriots’ values were again assessed with the Basic Values Survey (Gouveia, 2003); the 
instructions for participants’ own values remained the same as in Study 3.  In the country 
version of the value survey, participants were asked to rate how important they consider the 
values as guiding principles for the typical (native) citizen of the country in which they are 
currently living or had lived.  The internal consistencies of the six value types were low to 
good, both for the personal (.40 ≤ αs ≤ .69) and country version (.49 ≤ αs ≤ .73).  Participants 
were recruited through social networks, completed an online survey, and were not 
compensated. 
Representative comparison group.  For the representative comparison groups, we 
selected only those countries in which at least 20 of the participants were staying.  For Spain, 
the UK, and USA, we used data from another ongoing project (Liu & Vilar, 2017), which 
contained representative samples.  The participants had completed a back-translated version 
of the Basic Values Survey (Gouveia, 2003; Gouveia et al., 2014a) in their native language.  
Study 4 was part of a larger survey in which additionally personality traits (Big-5) and several 
items regarding participants’ abroad experience were measured.  In another manuscript that is 
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currently under review, the own values and traits of the participants are compared with the 
values of another sample of Brazilians who has not been abroad to identify differences 
between sojourners and non-sojourners (Vilar et al., 2017). 
Results and Discussion 
In a preliminary analysis, we tested whether those participants who were still abroad 
perceived compatriots’ values differently from those whose stay abroad was over.  However, 
none of the six interactions – one for each sub-function – reached significance (ps > .10).  We 
therefore collapsed both groups.   
Self-compatriots’ value comparisons.  The pattern of results of Studies 1-3 was 
largely replicated for Brazilian immigrants using Gouveia’s functional theory (2013; Table 4).  
Participants perceived their own interactive values, supra-personal, and existence values as 
more important than the values of the people in their host country, and promotion values and 
normative values as less important.  The correlation between own and perceived compatriots’ 
values were again small (.06 < r < .29).  As in Studies 1 to 3, the importance participants 
attributed to the value types for themselves correlated positively with the self-country bias, 
r(4) = .82.   
To test whether the pattern of results in Study 4 replicated the findings of Study 3, we 
correlated the effect sizes Cohen’s d for all 6 self-societal comparisons of Study 3 with the 
Cohen’s ds for the 6 comparisons of Study 4.  The correlation was positive, r(4) = .51.  Also, 
the effect sizes were in the same direction, except for the own-country comparison for 
excitement values.  
Accuracy of perceived compatriots’ values.  In a next step, we tested the accuracy 
of participants’ perception of the values of the country they were in (Spain, UK, or USA), 
using one-sample t-tests comparing the responses of our participants with the mean of the 
representative samples for each value types.  Participants in all countries strongly 
overestimated promotion values, and participants in the UK and USA also overestimated 
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excitement and normative values (Table 5).  Overall, these findings replicated the results of 
the other studies, because promotion values are closely related to the power and achievement 
values in Schwartz’s (1992) theory, whereas excitement values are closely related to 
hedonism and stimulation.  Finally, we found that the structure of Gouveias’s (2013) value 
model holds for own and perceived values (see Supplemental Materials, Figure S3).  
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and within-subject comparison of the perceived value 
importance for self and country 
 Mean (SD) df t  Cohen’s d 
 Self Country     
Excitement 5.19 (0.87) 5.02 (1.07) 266 2.25 * 0.17 
Suprapersonal 5.78 (0.78) 5.40 (1.01) 266 5.85 *** 0.42 
Interactive 5.49 (0.84) 4.76 (1.20) 266 8.37 *** 0.71 
Promotion 4.81 (0.97) 5.38 (0.96) 266 -7.69 *** -0.60 
Existence 5.98 (0.71) 5.79 (0.83) 266 3.34 *** 0.25 
Normative 4.25 (1.37) 5.00 (1.02) 266 -8.19 *** -0.62 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics and comparisons of perceived importance of compatriots’ values 
and actual value importance of representative sample 
    df t  Cohen’s d 
  Perceived Actual     
S
p
ai
n
 (
n
 =
 2
4
/1
0
0
8
) 
Excitement 5.30 (1.33) 4.97 21 1.17  0.25 
Suprapersonal 5.55 (1.04) 5.24 21 1.38  0.30 
Interactive 4.92 (1.05) 5.33 21 -1.82  -0.39 
Promotion 5.48 (0.77) 4.37 21 6.81 *** 1.45 
Existence 5.52 (0.70) 5.74 21 -1.52  -0.32 
Normative 4.76 (1.28) 4.53 21 0.84  0.18 
U
n
it
ed
 
K
in
g
d
o
m
 
(n
 =
 
5
9
/1
0
5
5
) Excitement 4.91 (0.97) 4.48 70 3.75 *** 0.45 
Suprapersonal 5.35 (1.03) 4.96 70 3.16 ** 0.37 
Interactive 4.78 (1.27) 5.17 70 -2.58 * -0.31 
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Promotion 5.29 (0.83) 4.12 70 11.84 *** 1.40 
Existence 5.78 (0.82) 5.65 70 1.38  0.16 
Normative 4.91 (0.87) 4.51 70 3.90 *** 0.46 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
(n
 =
 
2
4
/1
1
5
5
) 
Excitement 5.17 (1.02) 4.36 23 3.87 *** 0.79 
Suprapersonal 5.21 (1.19) 5.04 23 0.69  0.14 
Interactive 4.88 (1.41) 5.32 23 -1.55  -0.32 
Promotion 6.40 (0.95) 4.20 23 11.32 *** 2.31 
Existence 5.69 (0.85) 5.77 23 -0.44  -0.09 
Normative 5.58 (0.63) 4.82 23 5.92 *** 1.21 
Note.  Results based on one-sample t-tests.  Cohen’s d was computed with Mdiff / SD.  The first sample 
size in brackets after country name refers to students abroad, and the second sample size is the size of the 
representative sample. 
General Discussion 
The present research examined people’s own values and their estimations of 
compatriots’ values in various cultural contexts.  Our results show that people partly 
misperceive the values of people living in the same city, and of compatriots.  These 
misperceptions of city and compatriots’ values are systematic and consistent across cultural 
contexts and value models.  That is, people underestimate the importance their compatriots 
ascribe to more important values and overestimate the importance of less important values, in 
comparison to their own values, the actual values of the people living in the same city, and the 
actual values of their compatriots.   
Additional findings from each study are of interest.  Study 1 showed that the self-
family value differences were also systematic, although they were less pronounced: people 
perceive their families’ values closer to their own values than their countries values.  This 
new finding is in line with previous evidence that the family is close to the self-concept, 
facilitating similar overlapping biases in family- and self-perceptions (e.g., Tropp & Wright, 
2001).  Study 2 mainly replicated these findings in a representative sample in a British city. 
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Study 3 showed that systematic self-other differences can also be found in people from 
a non-Western country.  This result stands in contrast with previous trait-based research 
reporting that people in non-Western countries show weaker or null perceived self-other 
differences (Heine et al., 1999; Lee, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  This different pattern 
suggests that the perception of values and traits might be different.  An alternative possibility, 
however, is that Brazilians are more westernized than East Asians, who participated in the 
above-cited cross-cultural research.  Future research in East Asia is needed to address this 
question. 
The findings of Study 4 also point to a role for cultural stereotypes in estimates of 
compatriots’ values, at least among recent immigrants.  Normative values (e.g., obedience, 
tradition) were overestimated in UK and USA, but not in Spain.  This difference may have 
occurred because Spaniards are perceived as warmer and less organized than Britons and US-
Americans.  This suggestion is in line with previous research, where Spaniards were 
perceived by other Europeans to be more warm and less competent compared to Britons 
(Cuddy et al., 2009).  Future research is needed to test whether values are also perceived 
differently for various groups.  For example, abundant research has shown that people with 
different political attitudes (e.g., Democrats and Republicans) dislike each other (Iyengar, 
Sood, & Lelkes, 2012) and assume that their opinion is superior to the opinions of the other 
group (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013).  We would therefore expect based on 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that the perceived self-other differences is 
larger when rating the values of a disliked outgroup than when rating the values of one’s own 
country, because seeing oneself as higher on important values might increase the feeling of 
superiority towards the outgroup.  Indeed, it was found that religious people see other 
religious in-group members even more positively than themselves (Eriksson & Funcke, 2014).   
Additionally, we found across all studies that the structure of perceived compatriots’ 
values is almost identical to the structure of participants’ own values.  This is a novel finding 
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which is especially interesting given the low correlation between participants’ own and 
perceived compatriots’ values, but in line with recent research that found that Schwartz’s 
value structure could be replicated when the value priorities were rated by well-acquainted 
informants (Skimina & Cieciuch, 2017).  This is also an important extension concerning the 
universals in the structure of human values, which has recently been challenged (Raad et al., 
2016).  Previous studies claiming that the structure of human values is universal have relied 
on cross-cultural comparisons of own values (e.g., Bilsky et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1992).  In 
the present research, we demonstrated that the structure is also the same when perceptions of 
values are considered.  This finding suggests that the motivational compatibilities and 
conflicts observed for own values also hold for perceived country and family values.  For 
example, universalism and benevolence values were perceived to be more compatible than 
universalism and power (Studies 1 and 2), and interactive and suprapersonal values were 
more compatible than interactive and promotion values (Studies 3 and 4).  This similarity is 
important, because it allows researchers to derive specific hypotheses about the correlational 
pattern of perceived values with external variables (Gouveia, 2013; Schwartz, 1992).  
Specifically, because the structure of Schwartz’s (1992) model was replicated in perceived 
family and compatriots’ values, the correlational pattern should follow the sinusoidal wave 
pattern that is evident for own values (e.g., Boer & Fischer, 2013; Hanel, Zacharopoulos, 
Mégardon, & Maio, 2017; Schwartz, 1992).  
Our findings suggest that more important values are also perceived as more 
characteristic for oneself, whereas less important values are perceived as less characteristic, 
similar to less characteristic or negative traits (Alicke et al., 1995, 2001).  This result shows 
that it is not useful to treat values merely as positive constructs that are at least somewhat 
characteristic for everyone (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).  The differences matter.  If all that 
mattered were for values to be at least somewhat characteristic for oneself, all of them would 
have been overestimated, perhaps as a function of their importance.  However, the pattern of 
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results was similar to the classic studies of traits (Alicke, 1985; Alicke et al., 1995): Some 
compatriots’ values were perceived to be less important than for oneself, whereas other values 
were perceived to be more important.  This suggests that the importance of the compatriots’ 
values that are overestimated (e.g., power) are perceived as being less characteristic for 
oneself.  This reasoning is corroborated by literature linking power values, which tend to be of 
lower self-importance, to negative outcomes (e.g., Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Zacharopoulos et 
al., 2018).   
So far, we have not discussed potential causes for the self-other differences.  The 
literature on the perception of other people’s traits argued that the misperception is caused by 
a motivation to see oneself positively (Alicke et al., 1995; Brown, 2012).  However, the 
findings of a similar recent survey suggest that the self-other differences for values is likely 
not caused by the motivation to see oneself positively:  The perception of the compatriots’ 
self-transcendence values was weakly positively correlated with impression formation and 
self-deceptive enhancement, whereas perceived self-enhancement values were weakly 
negatively correlated with the two measures (Common Cause Foundation, 2016; this study 
replicates the present findings).  If the self-other differences for values were caused by the 
motivation to see oneself positively, the two bias measures would have been negatively 
correlated with perceived self-transcendence values and positively correlated with self-
enhancement values.  Thus, we do not think that a motivational basis causes this disparity 
between own and perceived values.  Instead, structural reasons in the social surroundings are 
a likely alternative explanation why people overestimate the self-enhancement values of 
others.  That is, people encounter strangers often in commercial environments such as 
shopping malls or in business contexts and see them expressing self-enhancement and 
hedonistic behaviors in the media or in advertisements.  Thus, the environment may cause 
people to believe that others value self-enhancement values more instead of doing this to feel 
better about themselves.   
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At first glance, this explanation seems to contradict the finding that power, 
achievement, or hedonism are considered to be less important than benevolence and 
universalism values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001): How do people exist in an environment that 
incentivizes behaviors expressing values that are less important to us?  The cause putatively 
lies in the situations that shape our perceptions of the values of others versus the situations 
that shape our most cherished values.  The situations that shape how we see others are those 
contexts in which we encounter people of low acquaintanceship to us.  These encounters 
occur virtually through the media (where the focus is on negative events), and physically in 
diverse public commercial spaces (e.g., shopping malls, supermarkets), day-to-day workplace 
environments, and educational contexts.  All of these spaces tend to emphasise work for 
monetary reward or goods.  (Educational contexts prioritise success as a means for later 
reward, such as employment.)  In contrast, our most precious places, within which personal 
values can be cultivated, are semi-private with family and friends.  Here, self-transcending, 
nurturing concerns prevail (e.g., “charity starts at home”).  Put simply, the stark difference 
between the spaces we occupy with strangers and the spaces we occupy with those nearest 
and dearest may exacerbate perceptions of self-other value differences. 
This line of thought also points to an important future direction of research: What 
would happen if people are made aware that they underestimate the self-transcendence values 
and overestimate the self-enhancement values of others? We assume that this awareness 
would increase their willingness to engage more with others and to work in a voluntary 
capacity because perceiving others to be more selfish is negatively correlated with the 
motivation to engage in civic participation (Common Cause Foundation, 2016)1.  
                                                 
1 Three authors of this paper have tested this hypothesis (N = 1,694, unpublished data). We correctly 
informed participants in the experimental group that around 74% of their compatriots value self-transcendences 
more than self-enhancement values (cf. Common Cause Foundation, 2016).  However, this did not affect their 
self-reported civic engagement and participation, social and environmental concerns, support for devolution, 
voting intentions, or satisfaction with life. However, in retrospect, the choice of the DVs was awkward: The DVs 
either referred to past behaviour or present beliefs, both constructs which are hardly be influenced by the 
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It is also important to consider limitations of the studies we conducted.  One limitation 
pertains to the low internal consistencies for some of the value types in Studies 2 to 4.  We do 
not think that the low internal consistencies pose a threat to our findings because the pattern 
of results remained mainly the same when we repeated the analysis on an item level.  More 
important, however, the reliability was established through MDS in all of the studies (Figures 
4, S1-S3).  Low internal consistencies of value measures are also consistent with the 
literature.  For example, Schwartz et al. (2001) explained the low internal consistencies of 
some value types (e.g., tradition) with few items for the value types in the PVQ.  These 
researchers did not consider the low reliabilities to be a major problem because the value 
types show good convergent and discriminant validity. 
Another limitation pertains to potential order effects.  In all studies, participants were 
first asked to rate the importance of values for themselves, before rating them for their family, 
city, or society.  However, whereas Studies 2 to 4 presented the own and perceived values in 
blocks on two subsequent pages, Study 1 presented the own and perceived values together.  
That is, participants first rated the importance of a value type for themselves, then for their 
family, and finally for their society, before moving on to the next value type.  In other words, 
the three response options were almost presented simultaneously.  Because the pattern of 
results was generally consistent across studies, we do not think that there are any order effects 
in place. 
Conclusion.  Perceptions of other people’s values are often inaccurate.  The 
importance that other people attribute to self-transcending / suprapersonal values is 
underestimated, whereas the importance of self-enhancement / promotion values is 
overestimated.  Those findings hold across countries, sample types, and value models.  This 
                                                                                                                                                        
manipulation.  Thus, researchers who intend to test this should ensure that their manipulation is strong enough 
and chose more appropriate DVs.   
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suggests that the values of other people are more selfless and less selfish than is often 
believed.  
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Supplemental Materials 
 
Structure of Own and Perceived Values 
Study 2 
Structure of values.  Finally, we tested whether the structure of Schwartz’ value 
model (Figure 1) holds for the perceived fellow citizens of their city values, again following 
the procedure described in Bilsky and Janik (2010).  Tucker's congruence coefficient 
indicated good fit for both the own values (.99, Stress-I = .14) and the perceived urban values 
(.99, Stress-I = .14).  Nevertheless, the common space plots supported again Schwartz’s 
structure (Figure S1), with only small deviations within the higher order value types.   
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Figure S1.  Common space plots for own values (panel A) and perceived citizens of 
their city values (panel B).  
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Study 3 
Structure of values.  Finally, we tested whether the structure of the functional theory 
(Figure 2) holds for the perceived compatriots’ values.  For this, we performed a MDS for 
participants’ own values and a second MDS for the perceived compatriots’ values, this time 
following Gouveia et al. (2014a, 2014b).  Tucker's congruence coefficient indicated good fit 
for both the own values (.95, Stress-I = .32) and the perceived compatriots’ values (.95, 
Stress-I = .31).  The common space plots also revealed a very good fit (Figure S2).  The 
survival needs were clearly distinguished from the thriving needs (see main diagonal lines in 
Figure S2) and the three values constituting each sub-function were grouped together. 
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Figure S2.  Common space plots for own values (panel A) and perceived compatriots’ 
values (panel B).  
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Study 4 
Structure of values.  Finally, we tested whether the structure of the functional theory 
(Figure 2) holds for perceived compatriots’ values.  For this, we performed a MDS for 
participants’ own values and a second MDS for perceived compatriots’ values, following 
Gouveia et al. (2014a, 2014b).  Tucker's congruence coefficient indicated good fit for both the 
own values (.94, Stress-I = .35) and the perceived compatriots’ values (.94, Stress-I = .35). 
The common space plots revealed a very good fit (Figure S3).  The survival needs were 
clearly distinguished from the thriving needs (see long line in Figure S3) and the three values 
constituting each sub-function were grouped together. 
42 
 
 
Figure S3.  Common space plots for own values (panel A) and perceived compatriots’ 
values (panel B).  
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Age Effects Study 2 
Mean differences between age groups 
We tested whether the seven age groups would differ on the 10 value types.  As a 
MANOVA was significant, we report in Table S1 the findings of 10 ANOVAs, one for each 
value type.  Descriptive statistics can be found in Table S2 and multiple comparisons in Table 
S3. 
Table S1 
Results of 10 ANOVAs, one separately for each value type 
 df1, df2 F p-value partial η2 
Security 6, 1181 9.654 .000 .047 
Tradition 6, 1181 2.821 .010 .014 
Conformity 6, 1181 4.336 .000 .022 
Benevolence 6, 1181 2.081 .053 .010 
Universalism 6, 1181 1.280 .263 .006 
Self_direction 6, 1181 3.008 .006 .015 
Stimulation 6, 1181 18.660 .000 .087 
Hedonism 6, 1181 9.445 .000 .046 
Achievement 6, 1181 22.205 .000 .101 
Power 6, 1181 10.567 .000 .051 
Note. df1: Numerator degrees of freedom, df2: denominator degrees of freedom. 
Table S2 
Descriptive statistics 
 Age range M SD n 
Security 18-24 4.35 1.11 133 
25-34 4.42 1.06 211 
35-44 4.15 1.01 209 
45-54 4.49 1.10 234 
55-64 4.80 1.02 206 
65-74 4.76 1.06 170 
75+ 4.94 0.83 25 
Total 4.50 1.08 1188 
Tradition 18-24 3.94 1.10 133 
25-34 4.03 1.11 211 
35-44 3.85 1.04 209 
45-54 3.95 1.13 234 
55-64 4.18 1.14 206 
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65-74 4.07 1.07 170 
75+ 4.54 1.01 25 
Total 4.02 1.10 1188 
Conformity 18-24 3.69 1.19 133 
25-34 3.83 1.17 211 
35-44 3.75 1.16 209 
45-54 3.85 1.12 234 
55-64 4.12 1.19 206 
65-74 4.12 1.12 170 
75+ 4.32 1.25 25 
Total 3.91 1.17 1188 
Benevolence 18-24 4.79 1.07 133 
25-34 4.80 0.86 211 
35-44 4.56 0.99 209 
45-54 4.57 0.97 234 
55-64 4.73 0.97 206 
65-74 4.61 1.01 170 
75+ 4.84 0.86 25 
Total 4.67 0.97 1188 
Universalism 18-24 4.67 0.95 133 
25-34 4.60 0.92 211 
35-44 4.50 0.85 209 
45-54 4.47 0.97 234 
55-64 4.45 0.93 206 
65-74 4.46 0.87 170 
75+ 4.48 1.05 25 
Total 4.52 0.92 1188 
Self-direction 18-24 4.45 1.03 133 
25-34 4.43 1.03 211 
35-44 4.24 0.98 209 
45-54 4.12 1.05 234 
55-64 4.29 0.95 206 
65-74 4.15 0.95 170 
75+ 4.44 1.13 25 
Total 4.28 1.01 1188 
Stimulation 18-24 4.09 1.17 133 
25-34 3.77 1.17 211 
35-44 3.65 1.19 209 
45-54 3.28 1.26 234 
55-64 3.07 1.19 206 
65-74 3.04 1.12 170 
75+ 2.82 1.14 25 
Total 3.44 1.24 1188 
Hedonism 18-24 4.09 1.04 133 
25-34 3.87 1.11 211 
35-44 3.73 1.15 209 
45-54 3.45 1.10 234 
55-64 3.48 1.19 206 
65-74 3.38 1.11 170 
75+ 3.16 1.07 25 
Total 3.63 1.14 1188 
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Achievement 18-24 4.24 1.11 133 
25-34 3.83 1.14 211 
35-44 3.56 1.28 209 
45-54 3.14 1.12 234 
55-64 3.15 1.17 206 
65-74 3.17 1.13 170 
75+ 2.80 1.35 25 
Total 3.46 1.23 1188 
Power 18-24 3.22 1.19 133 
25-34 3.09 1.17 211 
35-44 2.89 1.26 209 
45-54 2.57 1.03 234 
55-64 2.55 1.05 206 
65-74 2.62 0.96 170 
75+ 2.36 1.24 25 
Total 2.79 1.14 1188 
Note. M: Mean, SD: standard deviation, n: sample size per cell. 
 
Table S3 
Multiple comparisons (Sidak corrected) 
Dependent 
Variable Age (I) 
Age comparison 
group (J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) SE p 
Security 18-24 25-34 -0.07 0.12 1.000 
35-44 0.20 0.12 .860 
45-54 -0.14 0.11 .994 
55-64 -0.45 0.12 .003 
65-74 -0.41 0.12 .019 
75+ -0.59 0.23 .196 
25-34 18-24 0.07 0.12 1.000 
35-44 0.27 0.10 .165 
45-54 -0.07 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.38 0.10 .005 
65-74 -0.33 0.11 .044 
75+ -0.52 0.22 .351 
35-44 18-24 -0.20 0.12 .860 
25-34 -0.27 0.10 .165 
45-54 -0.34 0.10 .015 
55-64 -0.65 0.10 .000 
65-74 -0.61 0.11 .000 
75+ -0.79 0.22 .009 
45-54 18-24 0.14 0.11 .994 
25-34 0.07 0.10 1.000 
35-44 0.34 0.10 .015 
55-64 -0.31 0.10 .045 
65-74 -0.26 0.11 .240 
75+ -0.45 0.22 .607 
55-64 18-24 0.45 0.12 .003 
25-34 0.38 0.10 .005 
35-44 0.65 0.10 .000 
45-54 0.31 0.10 .045 
65-74 0.05 0.11 1.000 
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75+ -0.14 0.22 1.000 
65-74 18-24 0.41 0.12 .019 
25-34 0.33 0.11 .044 
35-44 0.61 0.11 .000 
45-54 0.26 0.11 .240 
55-64 -0.05 0.11 1.000 
75+ -0.18 0.23 1.000 
75+ 18-24 0.59 0.23 .196 
25-34 0.52 0.22 .351 
35-44 0.79 0.22 .009 
45-54 0.45 0.22 .607 
55-64 0.14 0.22 1.000 
65-74 0.18 0.23 1.000 
Tradition 18-24 25-34 -0.09 0.12 1.000 
35-44 0.09 0.12 1.000 
45-54 -0.01 0.12 1.000 
55-64 -0.24 0.12 .652 
65-74 -0.13 0.13 1.000 
75+ -0.60 0.24 .239 
25-34 18-24 0.09 0.12 1.000 
35-44 0.18 0.11 .889 
45-54 0.08 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.15 0.11 .970 
65-74 -0.04 0.11 1.000 
75+ -0.51 0.23 .457 
35-44 18-24 -0.09 0.12 1.000 
25-34 -0.18 0.11 .889 
45-54 -0.10 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.33 0.11 .046 
65-74 -0.22 0.11 .706 
75+ -0.69 0.23 .066 
45-54 18-24 0.01 0.12 1.000 
25-34 -0.08 0.10 1.000 
35-44 0.10 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.23 0.10 .428 
65-74 -0.12 0.11 .999 
75+ -0.59 0.23 .206 
55-64 18-24 0.24 0.12 .652 
25-34 0.15 0.11 .970 
35-44 0.33 0.11 .046 
45-54 0.23 0.10 .428 
65-74 0.11 0.11 1.000 
75+ -0.36 0.23 .942 
65-74 18-24 0.13 0.13 1.000 
25-34 0.04 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.22 0.11 .706 
45-54 0.12 0.11 .999 
55-64 -0.11 0.11 1.000 
75+ -0.47 0.24 .631 
75+ 18-24 0.60 0.24 .239 
25-34 0.51 0.23 .457 
35-44 0.69 0.23 .066 
45-54 0.59 0.23 .206 
55-64 0.36 0.23 .942 
65-74 0.47 0.24 .631 
Conformity 18-24 25-34 -0.15 0.13 .998 
35-44 -0.06 0.13 1.000 
45-54 -0.16 0.13 .991 
55-64 -0.43 0.13 .016 
65-74 -0.43 0.13 .027 
75+ -0.63 0.25 .230 
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25-34 18-24 0.15 0.13 .998 
35-44 0.08 0.11 1.000 
45-54 -0.01 0.11 1.000 
55-64 -0.29 0.11 .214 
65-74 -0.29 0.12 .295 
75+ -0.49 0.24 .640 
35-44 18-24 0.06 0.13 1.000 
25-34 -0.08 0.11 1.000 
45-54 -0.10 0.11 1.000 
55-64 -0.37 0.11 .024 
65-74 -0.37 0.12 .042 
75+ -0.57 0.24 .351 
45-54 18-24 0.16 0.13 .991 
25-34 0.01 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.10 0.11 1.000 
55-64 -0.27 0.11 .251 
65-74 -0.27 0.12 .342 
75+ -0.47 0.24 .682 
55-64 18-24 0.43 0.13 .016 
25-34 0.29 0.11 .214 
35-44 0.37 0.11 .024 
45-54 0.27 0.11 .251 
65-74 0.00 0.12 1.000 
75+ -0.20 0.25 1.000 
65-74 18-24 0.43 0.13 .027 
25-34 0.29 0.12 .295 
35-44 0.37 0.12 .042 
45-54 0.27 0.12 .342 
55-64 0.00 0.12 1.000 
75+ -0.20 0.25 1.000 
75+ 18-24 0.63 0.25 .230 
25-34 0.49 0.24 .640 
35-44 0.57 0.24 .351 
45-54 0.47 0.24 .682 
55-64 0.20 0.25 1.000 
65-74 0.20 0.25 1.000 
Benevolence 18-24 25-34 0.00 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.23 0.11 .518 
45-54 0.22 0.11 .564 
55-64 0.07 0.11 1.000 
65-74 0.18 0.11 .907 
75+ -0.05 0.21 1.000 
25-34 18-24 0.00 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.23 0.09 .269 
45-54 0.22 0.09 .296 
55-64 0.07 0.10 1.000 
65-74 0.18 0.10 .761 
75+ -0.04 0.21 1.000 
35-44 18-24 -0.23 0.11 .518 
25-34 -0.23 0.09 .269 
45-54 -0.01 0.09 1.000 
55-64 -0.16 0.10 .852 
65-74 -0.05 0.10 1.000 
75+ -0.28 0.21 .985 
45-54 18-24 -0.22 0.11 .564 
25-34 -0.22 0.09 .296 
35-44 0.01 0.09 1.000 
55-64 -0.15 0.09 .888 
65-74 -0.04 0.10 1.000 
75+ -0.27 0.20 .989 
55-64 18-24 -0.07 0.11 1.000 
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25-34 -0.07 0.10 1.000 
35-44 0.16 0.10 .852 
45-54 0.15 0.09 .888 
65-74 0.12 0.10 .997 
75+ -0.11 0.21 1.000 
65-74 18-24 -0.18 0.11 .907 
25-34 -0.18 0.10 .761 
35-44 0.05 0.10 1.000 
45-54 0.04 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.12 0.10 .997 
75+ -0.23 0.21 .999 
75+ 18-24 0.05 0.21 1.000 
25-34 0.04 0.21 1.000 
35-44 0.28 0.21 .985 
45-54 0.27 0.20 .989 
55-64 0.11 0.21 1.000 
65-74 0.23 0.21 .999 
Universalism 18-24 25-34 0.07 0.10 1.000 
35-44 0.17 0.10 .872 
45-54 0.20 0.10 .609 
55-64 0.21 0.10 .554 
65-74 0.20 0.11 .709 
75+ 0.19 0.20 1.000 
25-34 18-24 -0.07 0.10 1.000 
35-44 0.10 0.09 .997 
45-54 0.13 0.09 .935 
55-64 0.15 0.09 .902 
65-74 0.14 0.09 .968 
75+ 0.12 0.19 1.000 
35-44 18-24 -0.17 0.10 .872 
25-34 -0.10 0.09 .997 
45-54 0.03 0.09 1.000 
55-64 0.04 0.09 1.000 
65-74 0.03 0.09 1.000 
75+ 0.02 0.19 1.000 
45-54 18-24 -0.20 0.10 .609 
25-34 -0.13 0.09 .935 
35-44 -0.03 0.09 1.000 
55-64 0.01 0.09 1.000 
65-74 0.00 0.09 1.000 
75+ -0.01 0.19 1.000 
55-64 18-24 -0.21 0.10 .554 
25-34 -0.15 0.09 .902 
35-44 -0.04 0.09 1.000 
45-54 -0.01 0.09 1.000 
65-74 -0.01 0.09 1.000 
75+ -0.03 0.19 1.000 
65-74 18-24 -0.20 0.11 .709 
25-34 -0.14 0.09 .968 
35-44 -0.03 0.09 1.000 
45-54 0.00 0.09 1.000 
55-64 0.01 0.09 1.000 
75+ -0.02 0.20 1.000 
75+ 18-24 -0.19 0.20 1.000 
25-34 -0.12 0.19 1.000 
35-44 -0.02 0.19 1.000 
45-54 0.01 0.19 1.000 
55-64 0.03 0.19 1.000 
65-74 0.02 0.20 1.000 
Self_direction 18-24 25-34 0.03 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.21 0.11 .697 
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45-54 0.33 0.11 .049 
55-64 0.17 0.11 .954 
65-74 0.30 0.12 .179 
75+ 0.01 0.22 1.000 
25-34 18-24 -0.03 0.11 1.000 
35-44 0.19 0.10 .700 
45-54 0.31 0.10 .029 
55-64 0.14 0.10 .970 
65-74 0.28 0.10 .149 
75+ -0.01 0.21 1.000 
35-44 18-24 -0.21 0.11 .697 
25-34 -0.19 0.10 .700 
45-54 0.12 0.10 .994 
55-64 -0.05 0.10 1.000 
65-74 0.09 0.10 1.000 
75+ -0.20 0.21 1.000 
45-54 18-24 -0.33 0.11 .049 
25-34 -0.31 0.10 .029 
35-44 -0.12 0.10 .994 
55-64 -0.16 0.10 .846 
65-74 -0.03 0.10 1.000 
75+ -0.32 0.21 .952 
55-64 18-24 -0.17 0.11 .954 
25-34 -0.14 0.10 .970 
35-44 0.05 0.10 1.000 
45-54 0.16 0.10 .846 
65-74 0.14 0.10 .988 
75+ -0.15 0.21 1.000 
65-74 18-24 -0.30 0.12 .179 
25-34 -0.28 0.10 .149 
35-44 -0.09 0.10 1.000 
45-54 0.03 0.10 1.000 
55-64 -0.14 0.10 .988 
75+ -0.29 0.21 .985 
75+ 18-24 -0.01 0.22 1.000 
25-34 0.01 0.21 1.000 
35-44 0.20 0.21 1.000 
45-54 0.32 0.21 .952 
55-64 0.15 0.21 1.000 
65-74 0.29 0.21 .985 
Stimulation 18-24 25-34 0.32 0.13 .292 
35-44 0.44 0.13 .020 
45-54 0.80 0.13 .000 
55-64 1.02 0.13 .000 
65-74 1.04 0.14 .000 
75+ 1.27 0.26 .000 
25-34 18-24 -0.32 0.13 .292 
35-44 0.12 0.12 .999 
45-54 0.49 0.11 .000 
55-64 0.70 0.12 .000 
65-74 0.73 0.12 .000 
75+ 0.95 0.25 .003 
35-44 18-24 -0.44 0.13 .020 
25-34 -0.12 0.12 .999 
45-54 0.37 0.11 .025 
55-64 0.58 0.12 .000 
65-74 0.61 0.12 .000 
75+ 0.83 0.25 .020 
45-54 18-24 -0.80 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.49 0.11 .000 
35-44 -0.37 0.11 .025 
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55-64 0.21 0.11 .726 
65-74 0.24 0.12 .621 
75+ 0.46 0.25 .748 
55-64 18-24 -1.02 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.70 0.12 .000 
35-44 -0.58 0.12 .000 
45-54 -0.21 0.11 .726 
65-74 0.03 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.25 0.25 1.000 
65-74 18-24 -1.04 0.14 .000 
25-34 -0.73 0.12 .000 
35-44 -0.61 0.12 .000 
45-54 -0.24 0.12 .621 
55-64 -0.03 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.22 0.25 1.000 
75+ 18-24 -1.27 0.26 .000 
25-34 -0.95 0.25 .003 
35-44 -0.83 0.25 .020 
45-54 -0.46 0.25 .748 
55-64 -0.25 0.25 1.000 
65-74 -0.22 0.25 1.000 
Hedonism 18-24 25-34 0.21 0.12 .854 
35-44 0.36 0.12 .079 
45-54 0.64 0.12 .000 
55-64 0.61 0.12 .000 
65-74 0.71 0.13 .000 
75+ 0.93 0.24 .003 
25-34 18-24 -0.21 0.12 .854 
35-44 0.15 0.11 .984 
45-54 0.43 0.11 .001 
55-64 0.40 0.11 .006 
65-74 0.50 0.12 .000 
75+ 0.71 0.24 .054 
35-44 18-24 -0.36 0.12 .079 
25-34 -0.15 0.11 .984 
45-54 0.28 0.11 .174 
55-64 0.25 0.11 .377 
65-74 0.35 0.12 .055 
75+ 0.57 0.24 .300 
45-54 18-24 -0.64 0.12 .000 
25-34 -0.43 0.11 .001 
35-44 -0.28 0.11 .174 
55-64 -0.03 0.11 1.000 
65-74 0.07 0.11 1.000 
75+ 0.29 0.24 .995 
55-64 18-24 -0.61 0.12 .000 
25-34 -0.40 0.11 .006 
35-44 -0.25 0.11 .377 
45-54 0.03 0.11 1.000 
65-74 0.10 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.32 0.24 .986 
65-74 18-24 -0.71 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.50 0.12 .000 
35-44 -0.35 0.12 .055 
45-54 -0.07 0.11 1.000 
55-64 -0.10 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.22 0.24 1.000 
75+ 18-24 -0.93 0.24 .003 
25-34 -0.71 0.24 .054 
35-44 -0.57 0.24 .300 
45-54 -0.29 0.24 .995 
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55-64 -0.32 0.24 .986 
65-74 -0.22 0.24 1.000 
Achievement 18-24 25-34 0.41 0.13 .035 
35-44 0.69 0.13 .000 
45-54 1.10 0.13 .000 
55-64 1.09 0.13 .000 
65-74 1.07 0.13 .000 
75+ 1.44 0.25 .000 
25-34 18-24 -0.41 0.13 .035 
35-44 0.28 0.11 .261 
45-54 0.69 0.11 .000 
55-64 0.69 0.11 .000 
65-74 0.66 0.12 .000 
75+ 1.03 0.25 .001 
35-44 18-24 -0.69 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.28 0.11 .261 
45-54 0.41 0.11 .004 
55-64 0.41 0.11 .008 
65-74 0.38 0.12 .033 
75+ 0.76 0.25 .047 
45-54 18-24 -1.10 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.69 0.11 .000 
35-44 -0.41 0.11 .004 
55-64 -0.01 0.11 1.000 
65-74 -0.03 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.34 0.25 .977 
55-64 18-24 -1.09 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.69 0.11 .000 
35-44 -0.41 0.11 .008 
45-54 0.01 0.11 1.000 
65-74 -0.03 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.35 0.25 .974 
65-74 18-24 -1.07 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.66 0.12 .000 
35-44 -0.38 0.12 .033 
45-54 0.03 0.12 1.000 
55-64 0.03 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.37 0.25 .952 
75+ 18-24 -1.44 0.25 .000 
25-34 -1.03 0.25 .001 
35-44 -0.76 0.25 .047 
45-54 -0.34 0.25 .977 
55-64 -0.35 0.25 .974 
65-74 -0.37 0.25 .952 
Power 18-24 25-34 0.13 0.12 .999 
35-44 0.33 0.12 .162 
45-54 0.66 0.12 .000 
55-64 0.67 0.12 .000 
65-74 0.60 0.13 .000 
75+ 0.86 0.24 .009 
25-34 18-24 -0.13 0.12 .999 
35-44 0.20 0.11 .798 
45-54 0.52 0.11 .000 
55-64 0.54 0.11 .000 
65-74 0.47 0.12 .001 
75+ 0.73 0.24 .042 
35-44 18-24 -0.33 0.12 .162 
25-34 -0.20 0.11 .798 
45-54 0.33 0.11 .042 
55-64 0.34 0.11 .039 
65-74 0.28 0.12 .293 
52 
 
75+ 0.53 0.24 .397 
45-54 18-24 -0.66 0.12 .000 
25-34 -0.52 0.11 .000 
35-44 -0.33 0.11 .042 
55-64 0.01 0.11 1.000 
65-74 -0.05 0.11 1.000 
75+ 0.21 0.23 1.000 
55-64 18-24 -0.67 0.12 .000 
25-34 -0.54 0.11 .000 
35-44 -0.34 0.11 .039 
45-54 -0.01 0.11 1.000 
65-74 -0.06 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.19 0.24 1.000 
65-74 18-24 -0.60 0.13 .000 
25-34 -0.47 0.12 .001 
35-44 -0.28 0.12 .293 
45-54 0.05 0.11 1.000 
55-64 0.06 0.12 1.000 
75+ 0.26 0.24 .999 
75+ 18-24 -0.86 0.24 .009 
25-34 -0.73 0.24 .042 
35-44 -0.53 0.24 .397 
45-54 -0.21 0.23 1.000 
55-64 -0.19 0.24 1.000 
65-74 -0.26 0.24 .999 
Note. SE: Standard error. 
 
Age effects: Perceived value importance for self and fellow citizens of their city 
Table S4 
Cohen’s d for self-other comparisons, separately for each age group 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
Power -0.53 -0.67 -0.56 -0.70 -0.59 -0.55 -0.68 
Achievement 0.14 -0.21 -0.18 -0.46 -0.39 -0.45 -0.72  
Hedonism -0.40 -0.34 -0.41 -0.54 -0.65 -0.69 -0.55  
Stimulation 0.08 -0.19 -0.16 -0.23 -0.48 -0.44 -0.43  
Self-direction 0.32 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.37  
Universalism 0.76 0.70 0.84 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.87  
Benevolence 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.78  
Tradition 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.79  
Conformity 0.30 0.34 0.39 0.58 0.61 0.77 0.75  
Security 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.29 0.43 0.35 0.37  
Note. Columns present all seven age groups. 
 
